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Introduction
During the last ten years, a number of spectacular confrontations between government and private sector representatives of the "North" and the "South This paper will be summarizing background and implications of these two conflicts and their resolution in the context of the multiple interactions of major actors in the markets for medicines of rich and poor countries, with special emphasis on the power and politics of the large research oriented MNPCs, their current multiple problems, and the rising significance of the pharmaceutical industries in the newly industrializing countries (NICs). It will focus on four issues, which include:
-the characteristics of the main actors,
-the nature of their interfaces with the other actors in the context of the rapidly spreading HIV/AIDS crisis, -the response of the nation states to the global health challenge, and -the impact of the emerging institutional health governance on the very crisis, which was so instrumental for shaping the new institutional set-up.
After presenting a summary evaluation of the major characteristics of the MNPCs, a step-bystep analysis of the major interfaces the industry had with public and private entities in the face of the HIV/AIDS crisis will form the heart of the essay. The answers to questions three and four concerning the ability of nation states to withstand and/or absorb global forces and the impact of the emerging institutional setting on the pandemic's outcome are a consequence of the earlier analysis of the nature and results of the interfaces having taken place in the period between 1995 and 2005.
The examination of the MNPCs in the global health arena offers great opportunities for every social science discipline and even more for inter-disciplinary research. This analysis will use elements of strategy models, which have been increasingly used by economists, business analysts, and legal experts. It will combine those approaches with a political science framework which examines the emergence of global health governance (GHG) in the context of multi-level governance.
The research for this article has been part of the GIGA research project on "Global Health Governance: Institutional Change and the Interfaces Between Global and Local Politics in the Poverty-Oriented Fight of Diseases", funded by the Volkswagen-Foundation 1 . In the context of this research project Global health governance (GHG) is defined as the totality of collective regulations to deal with international and trans-national interdependence problems in health (Bartsch and Kohlmorgen, 2005) . Here we go one step further and argue that GHG can be conceived as "systems of rule at all levels in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has trans-national repercussions affecting health." (Buse, 2006: 14, following the global governance definition by Rosenau (2004: 45) . 1 More on the project, participants and publications can be found under: www.giga-hamburg.de/ghg.
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Particularly useful for analyzing the MNPCs in the multiple public and private negotiations are a game theory oriented approach and the notion of "forum" or "regime shifting" (Helfer, 2004 ), which the corporations and then the governments of the North used in internationalizing IPRs in the context of TRIPS, only to find out that international NGOs and representatives of the South shot back by using the same strategy in fighting for people's access to low cost medicines. Both groups of actors have perceived their goals in a socio-political structure and an institutional setting which allowed them to pursue those different objectives and carry them out. By doing so, they have been changing the very economic and social structure of global health architecture and with its concerns, activities, and rules. In brief, the social action analyzed here has been co-determined by the property of actors and the existing socio-political structure (Sell, 2000) .
Major Features of the Multinational Pharmaceutical Corporations
The purchasing price of pharmaceuticals, sales of which make up about 15% of total health expenditures in the rich countries but are estimated to reach between 20 and 25% in the poor countries, can vary by hundreds of percent, depending on which class of drugs they belong to and in which country they are sold. The "innovator" drugs are protected by patents, granting the producer a monopoly rent in compensation for past and future research and development efforts. While not officially disclosed, after passing a series of tests and approval from public regulatory authorities, the MNPCs base and rationalize their pricing decision not on short and long run costs but on the degree of competition from similar drugs, the elasticity of demand, and the extent that the new patented drug substitutes for earlier treatments of the disease, many of which have been expensive, especially when it entailed medical treatment in hospitals (Neukirchen, 2004: 93) . 2
In the past the industry has been reaping the benefits of that type of pricing and the protection granted them by law rather extensively, even if governments intervened with price controls. In the US the authorities have refrained from direct market intervention. Instead, the firms enjoy a great number of positive incentives, ranging from tapping results from superior public sector institutions to tax reductions for locating in special US territories. 3 The fa-2 Increased competition has narrowed the wide differences among various international markets. We are still far away from the convergence to one price, but the globalisation of markets working into that direction in OECD countries. "The ten oldest drugs, launched before 1988, are up to four times more expensive in America than elsewhere, the ten newest drugs, launched after 1997, are only twice the price." (The Economist, 2005a: 12) vorable policy framework has made it possible for the major firms to be consistently top financial performers of all industrial branches, irrespective of profitability being measured by return on revenues or on assets. Despite recent legal problems concerning negative side effects of some of their "blockbuster" medicines, the pharmaceutical industry's net revenues averaged close to 30% of shareholders' equity, remaining one of the leading industries in the annual ranking of Forbes' Magazine in 2003 and . Large legal departments make sure that nobody infringes on the patents and try to prolong them by applying for additional patents if innovations can be added on to the existing drug.
For an industry which is facing high fixed costs in research and development, merging and acquisition to reach ever larger economies of scale is a must. As a consequence, the concentration of the industry has taken on a rapid pace in the last two decades. 4 While there were still over 30 major pharmaceutical companies engaged in R&D in the 1980s, that number has shrunk to just over a dozen, all of them concentrating on the goal to invent, produce and sell a "blockbuster", i.e. a drug which reaches annual sales of over US 1 billion. 5
As Table 1 indicates, the largest sixteen research oriented pharmaceuticals had annual sales averaging $18 billion in 2004, with some of their major products ringing up over $1 billion per year. The statistics on the stock market value of those companies' stocks, however, reveal that the majority of them have faced significant buyers' sell-offs in the recent past, reflecting the growing competition from the generic industries, the problem with negative side effects showing up after their drugs have been pushed to the market too rapidly, and the increasing wave of informal marketing channels at discount prices, of which the Canadian imports into the U.S. is only the most prominent example. 6 4 In the last two decades of the 20 th century, there were close to 50 mergers in the pharmaceutical industry, valued over US$ 1 billion, 17 of which crossed the $5 billion mark. (Zeller, 2001) 5
The most successful "blockbuster" drug is Lipitor, an anti-cholesterol medication which provided its producer Pfizer with annual sales of over $3 billion in 2004. Its patent is currently challenged by India's largest manufacturer Rambaxy in various courts around the world. For a discussion of the battle in British courts see, The Washington Post, October 13, 2005. As Table 1 has indicated, the major MNPCs' annual outlays for R&D average over $3 billion, amounting to 17% of their sales. These expenditures, even if some of them could be partly allocated to marketing, are a significant amount both in absolute and in relative terms, routinely used for the industry's claim for the high prices they cover for innovator drugs. While the industry's quoted cost of each new drug development amounting to $800 million has been questioned, there is no doubt that the industries R&D outlays have advanced rapidly in the last 10 years, reaching close to $80 billion in 2004, which was double the size a decade earlier. 12 However, what has perplexed the industry and the public is the fact that the results in terms of new products and licenses has not caught up with the expenditures but shows a declining trend, falling from an average of 40 in the mid 1990s to less than 30 in the earlier years of this decade, as illustrated below.
There would seem to be several reasons that, in spite of running faster and faster, the industry is losing ground in providing the public with innovative products. Among them, the more important problems would seem to be:
-Essential drugs against killer diseases like diphtheria and tetanus with relatively simple cause and effect relationships have been developed and are on the market.
The more recent diseases like cancer and AIDS are more complicated and harder to fight, requiring substantially larger R&D resources -The deciphering of the human gene promises great advances in the future, but the change from scientific research to practical application is requiring many more years than originally anticipated -The extensive marketing has put the R&D Departments into a position to come up with ever more effective medication, which are far above the required inputs of human and financial resources used in the past 12 The $800 mill. R&D spending on each new drug was taken from a Tuft's University study funded by the industry, which also supplied selected data from ten of their major firms. A thorough examination by the Public Citizen Congress Watch came to the conclusion that average R&D cost for each new product came closer to $100 million during the late 1990s (Young and Surrusco, 2001 ).In addition, significant basic research is done in public hospitals and laboratories. For good account of that issue see Goozner (2003) . Most of the major pharmaceutical companies had closed their research labs for tropical and other diseases of poor people in the 1980s and 1990s. The rate of return was too low (Neukirchen, 2004: 215) .
Unfortunately, there has been a rapid upturn of infectious diseases which were expected to be under control for some time. One example is tuberculosis, the germs of which have currently infected about one third of the world population, with two million people dying every year. Most of the germs have become resistant against antibiotics, which were once hailed as an effective weapon to wipe that illness off the planet. These events took place between 1995 and 2005, some of which have also been highlighted in contributions of a recent Joint WHO-GIGA Workshop 15 What is unique in this case is that the MNPCs were both directly and indirectly not only the major actor in the fight over prices of the ARVs against AIDS, but they were also responsible for the introduction and negotiations of TRIPS and TRIPS + in the bi-lateral treaties, although those were officially pure governmental interfaces. Those involvements in turn were based on the fact that MNCs have not only vast resource based power, both material and immaterial, but got also fully involved in the decision making and formal norm setting process, normally reserved for government negotiations.
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As a consequence, the MNPCs found themselves in a number of interfaces, ranging from organizational and legal ones like the encounters with South Africa over the programmatic ones, which entailed the drafting of the TRIPS legislation and its discussion with USTR, to resource transfer based interfaces occurring in the fight over drug price with Brazil and increased efforts to support R&D of neglected diseases. 16 With the MNPCs using their vast financial resources quite extensively on all fronts, most of the encounters were really a combination of at least two or three of those types of interfaces. By putting perhaps too much emphasis on the legal interfaces at the beginning of the "access to medicine in poor countries discussion", they did not get the expected results, as they admitted quite openly afterwards. 17 The pharmaceutical industry analysts have long used game theory in their strategic thinking and advice to management. In the case of deciding about alternative large research projects, which not only faced the risk of failure but also the possibility of strong competition even after many years of successful R&D, management used game theory approaches, helping them to decide which projects to sponsor and which to drop or delay. 18 In the case of internationalizing IPRs the MNPCs chose the "regime shifting" approach, which they deemed was secure, since it had the backing of the US Government. That strategy did seem to work out well at the beginning, when the shift of a new legal and enforceable base for IPRs from WIPO to WTO was accomplished without major opposition, as highlighted in Graph 2.
By simultaneously pressing for the internationalization of IPRs at WIPO, into which the US Government introduced the Sustained Patent Treaty (SPT), attaining a successful introduction and legislation of the TRIPS Agreement at WTO, and insisting on even tougher (TRIPS +) IPRS regulations in various bi-lateral treaties, the governments of the "North" in general and the USTR in particular followed the script designed and proposed by the high tech MNCs, among which the MNPCs played a crucial role. 19
16 They were also involved in discursive interfaces, both through their major associations on the national and international level (PhRMA and IFPMA) and also top executives of the major companies taking part in major discussions with public and other private partners and opponents 17 The Economist (2005b) . 18 See for example Senn's game theory approach to project prioritisation in the pharmaceutical industry (Senn 1996) . 19 For an extensive discussion of the MNPCs role in drafting the TRIPS Agreement, see Sell (2000) ;
for a close examination of MNC involvement in follow-up on TRIPS, see Jawara and Kwa (2003) . Many of the developing countries saw it differently. Respected free-trade advocates like Jagdish Bhagwati described the WTO's intellectual property protection as a tax that most poor countries pay on their use of knowledge, "constituting an unrequited transfer to the rich producing countries." (Sexton 2001: 10) .
AIDS, Doha and Revised TRIPS
It was the rapid spread of the HIV/AIDS virus in developing countries and the NGO campaigns which made officials in the developed and developing countries aware that the stringent conditions of the IPRs in the TRIPS Agreement made it difficult to finance the treatment of the HIV/AIDS infected patients in their countries. As a consequence, discussions over poor countries' access to low cost medicines against serious diseases endangering the public 20 They were, however, also quick to point out that it was not an official interpretation of the WTO agreements or members' positions. To soothe the fear of the MNPCs and their governments in the developed countries, however, the General Council's Chairperson underlined the fact that that the "system that will be established by the Decision should be used in good faith to protect public health and, without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the Decision, not be an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives" (WTO News, 2003) .
It took another two years before stipulating a binding agreement on the issue proposed by the famous paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, allowing countries to issue compulsory licenses for generic production, both domestically -if the production capacity was available -or abroad, if the domestic economy was not in the position to produce that drug. 22
Brought forward by the NGOs (in particular MSF and their Access to Essential Medicines Campaign) and the ensuing worldwide moral indignation, the South pressed for and succeeded in getting changes in the TRIPS agreements, which would allow them to import AIDS medication from the lowest priced source, but prohibit re-export of that medication to third countries.
During those negotiations, the North tried to split the Southern vote, by offering the least developing countries special trade advantages if they would not join the middle income countries' quest for altering the original TRIPS Agreement (Jawara and Kwa, 2003) . That strategy of "divide and rule" has been used many times by dominant countries outwitting the majority of its opponents and leads itself to a game theoretical approach. 23 In this con- in developed markets, but after some deliberation they fell in line with the rest of the developing world.
The Battle over Drug Prices and the Southern Offensive at International Organizations
As the negotiations over the TRIPS Amendments in the halls of the WTO in Geneva became ever more entwined in the definition and interpretation of specific clauses and paragraphs, the real battles took place in the market place for ARVs. As Latin America's leading industrializing country Brazil had an ongoing discussion with the US government regarding the enactment and implementation of full blown legislation covering patents. That issue became a major point of disagreement, when the government's sponsored generic industry started to produce two of the twelve ARVs needed by Brazil to effectively treating HIV/AIDS.
The federal and some local government authorities had been getting seriously involved in starting up production of ARVs in the late 1990s. During that time period, Brazil had already been able to cut mortality rates of AIDS by half, lower the hospitalization of the victims by 80% and reduce the mother-to-child transmission significantly. Since the Brazilian Government provided the treatments free of charge to every patient in need, the case for lowering the public sector costs of the patented ARV medicines became a priority for Brazilian policy makers.
Encouraged by the willingness of the North to respect the Southern demands for issuing compulsory licenses in the case of a national emergency, Brazil entered into negotiations with a number of MNPCs to ask them for significant price reductions or face the threat of the country issuing those compulsory licenses. That encounter obviously led itself to a perfect game scenario with possible moves and countermoves, containing considerable downward risks on both sides should they lose that battle. For the Brazilian challenger, there were considerations beyond the payments of royalties for the license, starting with a serious test of the production capability and cost containment of its government owned laboratories, and ending with the availability and costs of the required ingredients. For the MNPCs, adherence to the stipulated prices was facing the possibility of the firms to be shut out of a large and growing market of a major emerging economy and the undesirability to set a precedent for compulsory licenses detested by most MNPCs. Cohen and Lybecker (2005) have developed a scenario, borrowed from simple game theory, which reflects well the options one of the MNPC faced by bargaining with the Brazilian government authorities. A slightly changed version of their diagrammatic presentation is depicted below.
Graph 3: Price Bargaining for Presription Drugs
Note: Letters in brackets show the preferences of the two parties. In the case of the MNC outcome W is best before X, which is better than Y, and Z is the worst. For Brazil A is to be the top, followed by B and C, with D actually not being seriously considered.
It is fairly easy for the MNPC to realize that it would not make sense to immediately go for a deep discount, especially since the companies believed to have the U.S. government support behind them. On the other hand, while it might have been possible to bluff and hang tough, believing that the issue of CL is even more distasteful to the Brazilians than it is to the industry, it might be the best strategy to start with a relatively small discount, which will not have the best outcome (after all X is less favorable than W but better than Y and Z), but may find Brazil's willingness to agree, since that outcome is at least second best for the country(B is worse than A but better than C). In case Brazil rebuffs the offer of a small discount, further negotiations would seem a probable outcome rather than an immediate issuing of a CL.
What is missing here, are the probabilities attached to the expected reaction of the Brazilian policy makers and with it the outcome of the game. Clearly, the deep discount would have a fairly high probability to be accepted, but leave no room for any further maneuvers to improve the outcome for the MNPC. On the other hand, the probability of the government's willingness to come back to the bargaining table with the MNPC not being willing to give in an inch would also be low and lead straight away to the issuing of a CL. So to start with a relatively small price reduction would seem not only to provide both parties with interme- The success on the national front encouraged Brazil and the NGOs also to play an increasingly more active and demanding role at the international global health arena. The outcomes were realized in two initiatives at the WIPO and WHO. After successfully renegotiating TRIPS, the developing countries under the leadership of Argentina, Brazil, and Kenya introduced a "Development Agenda" into WIPO, hoping to provoke further discussion of the value and the best timing of IPRS legislation in developing countries. At the same time, the same countries took a plan from one of the NGOs concerning the change of patent rights in the light of the need to increase not only the peoples' access to medicines at reasonable prices but also the access to knowledge (A2K) in general.
By also using the strategy of forum shifting, the South countered the initiatives of the North with an increasing number of initiatives, which transferred the limelight of global health issues in general and the patent issue in particular from the WTO to the WHO, where it 21 would seem to belong. That scenario is depicted in Graph 4. The latter initiative was undertaken by the NGOs, which were increasingly looking for alternatives to the existing IPRs, drafted for private sector development but not to solve public health issues (Love and Hubbard, 2005) . Kenya, Argentina and Brazil officially introduced the Medical R&D Treaty into the WHO in 2005.
Graph 4: Initiatives of the South in the Global Health Arena

The Counteroffensive of the MNPCs and a Further Regime Shifting Exercise
At the time of the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement, the USTR had also begun to introduce strict IPRs legislation into bi-lateral trade treaties. Starting with the NAFTA Agreement, the strengthening of the original TRIPS to become TRIPS + was the basis for almost all trade negotiations the USTR undertook either with individual countries or a group of countries in the South. In the case of Latin America, the pressure put on the small countries "south of the border" became particularly severe and provide a good example of the con- Issues included restrictions of compulsory licensing, which limit the circumstances under which the CACM countries (and also most other nations negotiating FTAs with the US) can issue those compulsory licenses authorizing generic manufacturers to produce low cost versions of patented drugs. Closely related to it is the prohibition of parallel importation, preventing developing countries from importing patented drugs from the most favorable available source. The other two issues revolve around the extension of patent protection for new uses of already patented products and the requirements to have the drug regulatory authorities in the CACM countries to adjudicate patents, despite their lack of expertise in the area of patent enforcement.
On the other hand, there are no provisions that would promote greater access to affordable medicines, such as: the "Bolar-type" provision to ensure that countries permit testing and experimental work required for the registration of a generic medicine during the patent period of the original product so that generics can enter the market immediately after the expiration of the patent. There are also no requirements for patent holders to disclose the "best mode" for reproducing an invention so that society can benefit from it after the patent expires. Finally, there are no caps on patent extensions for delays in the issuance of a patent or the marketing approval process.
The report concludes:
"Taken together, these trade provisions will significantly impede the ability of developing countries to obtain access to inexpensive, life-saving medications. Contrary to the Doha Declaration, these provisions in the trade agreements advance the financial interests of large multinational drug companies at the expense of the developing world's ability to address public health problems." (Committee on Government Reform, 2005: 5). 27 In short, while the MNPCs and the US government retreated in their negotiations within the WTO and showed some flexibility with the large emerging economies, they more than compensated for that compromise by strengthening the IPRs rules in the negotiations with the smaller middle income countries. It can be expected that once more and more of those countries are signing those bi-lateral trade agreements, the pressure on nations like Brazil, India and China to fall in line with the rest of other emerging economies and follow tougher IPRS implementation rules will increase.
Pharma and the Rise of Global Public-Private Partnerships
While the MNPCs played only an indirect though important role in the bi-lateral trade agreements, they also reacted on other fronts of developing countries' concern more forcefully after the public attacks and surprising losses against players of the South.
Since the major clash with South Africa and Brazil, the pharmaceuticals have been engaged in an increasing number of partnerships, both with public agencies and private NGOs, to fight infectious diseases. In the case of AIDS there were eighteen of those networks active in
October of 2004, and in the case of tuberculoses and malaria there were eight and eleven respectively (IPFMA, 2004b) . Table 2 provides an overview of some the partnerships the companies are involved in the case of AIDS. 28 27 A real controversy arose in the negotiations between the USTR and Guatemala, the Congress of which had introduced and approved legislation, which denied the data exclusivity provision. Although directly contradicting the WTO Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (the Doha Declaration), the US made that provision a must for the trade negotiations and threatened Guatemala to delay ratification of the CAFTA Agreement. Different from Brazil, the Guatemalan Congress gave in and issued Decree 31-88, overruling the previous legislation 28 In addition, there are also a growing number of them being very active in supporting the fight against malaria and TBC as well as such tropical diseases as dengue fever, or join in the Global Alliance to Eliminate Leprosy, The Sleeping Sickness Program and the International Trachoma Initiative. They are also actively participating in important initiatives against vaccine preventable diseases as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) and the Vaccine Fund (VF). The MNPCs are conducting about half of those projects, of which half again they are doing on their on their own and the other half within a PPP. 30 Even in the case of their own research, the idea is to finally test and market the product with public partners, because of the public sector character of the market for those medications. The R&D concentrates on ma-25 laria and tuberculosis but also includes the search for medication and vaccination for dengue fever, onchocerciasis and visceral leishmaniasis.
Of the $250 million "public" funding to support the PPPs, only 16% comes from governments, while the Gates Foundation alone has contributed nearly 60%. Since Mr. Gates has paid much attention to the Foundation's money being spent efficiently, the evaluation has been on top of the many R&D attempts in this area. With respect to health outcomes, the PPP model showed superior results than the industry-alone developed medication. In short, the rapidly increasing PPPs may become the major provider for low cost medicines of the formerly neglected diseases. 31
It is still premature to provide a comprehensive evaluation of those efforts, since most of them have only started recently. Some public sector involvement has led to high administrative costs and poor management of such programs. The legal status, corporate governance, and operational efficiency are issues which will have to be analyzed in some detail, before a solid judgment can be made. However, for the pharmaceutical companies participating in the PPPs, one would expect an efficient execution of the commitments undertaken combined with the necessary supply logistics, storage and documentation.
From a purely financial contributions' point of view, it would seem to be relevant to note that the engagement of the big pharmaceutical companies amount to over one third of the total public US healthcare assistance to the third World. In addition, the industry is claiming that "our partnership with leading academic, governmental, multilateral, non governmental and community-based organizations exceeds or rivals in total size the annual budgets of the World Health Organization and the World Bank's health programs, among others" (IPFMA, 2004a) .
That leaves the question to the emerging suppliers of low cost generic drugs from advanced developing countries, particularly Indian and/or Chinese producers. Indian suppliers of lowest cost ARVs have played an important role in reducing the costs of treating AIDS in the past 5 years. However, in cases of future health emergencies at home, those firms will have first to supply the large populations of their own country. In order to compensate for that commitment, the companies would rather turn around and sell to prosperous markets than to their poor neighbors. One recent example of delivery problems of AIDS medication 31 Four country studies on the impact of PPPs in addressing access to low cost medicine issue provided similarly encouraging findings. (Caines et al., 2004) . While the researchers admitted that the quantification of benefits for public health derived from such donation programs as AIDS medication to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV were difficult, several indicator showed that the program had led to short term favorable results. A similar positive evaluation was given to the joint Novartis-WHO discounted drug program for tropical diseases. 32 A more complete narrative of that process in Brazil has been treated in an earlier text (Wogart and Calcagnotto, 2006 The confrontation and dialogue between the Northern and Southern representatives have not limited themselves to exchanging legal opinions and issuing threats, but on many other levels, both formally and informally. In addition to the discussion within the international organizations and in the government buildings in New York, Geneva, Washington, Brasilia, and New Delhi, there were numerous meetings, which had senior representatives of the WTO, the respective governments, the MNPCs, and the NGOs discuss the major issues.
Sponsored by the Foreign Policy Centre in London, a report issued in 2001 stated that, "despite dissonance over many of the fundamentals, the seminar opened several doors for potential solutions among which were: -The introduction of a tiered patenting system, -increased flexibility of TRIPS for developing countries, -the creation of an international fund to support the consolidation of health systems in those parts of the developing world hardest hit by the AIDS virus" (Walters et al., 2001) .
By 2003, two of those proposals were translated into reality. The Doha Declaration gave a wider and much more flexible interpretation of the TRIPS Agreements and the Global Fund against AIDS, Malaria, and TB (GFAMT) has been installed to grant financing for prevention and treatment programs against those diseases in the affected developing countries. In the meantime, experts of intellectual property rights are rethinking some of the rules written into the legislation of both the developed and developing countries, and the multinationals are trying to figure out how to manage a multi-tiered price system, which benefits the poor in the developing countries but not traders who are re-exporting the discounted drugs to the high priced markets of developed countries. have identified the poor countries' access to pharmaceuticals as one constraint among many others. They include the lack of credible and resource based health strategies, scarcity of qualified human resources, and the need to mobilize individual households and families, who are the key and underrated actors in the health sector (Wagstaff and Claeson, 2004) .
Even in the narrower confinement regarding the supply to essential medicines, price is only one variable. Without strategic procurement, improved logistics, and training of pharmacists, the reliable supply of drugs cannot be achieved. The OECD countries and the multilateral institutions have launched an increasing amount of support programs to provide that framework. Among others, the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria (GFATM) is looking for new networks among developing countries to improve production techniques trade logistics, including storing and delivery techniques. Here, both the traditional and the emerging pharmaceutical industries will have to play a crucial role to make the Fund's programs successful. (Attridge and Preker, 2005) The buildup of the national, state and local social infrastructure will take time. The summary statistics show how far the fight against AIDS has been proceeding in the recent past, indicating also how far away the majority of the countries are in treating current victims. Table 3 indicates the amount of people in developing countries on the five continents requiring treatment in 2005 in descending order. Out of the 6.5 million people, over 72% come from Africa, followed by Asia's much larger population, the share of which requiring treatment would still seem to be relatively modest in relative terms, but is believed to increase rapidly in the years to come. Columns 3 and 4 show the treatment in each continent in absolute and relative terms, reflecting the much more active role of private and public sector efforts in Latin American health sectors, which reached a 62% coverage compared to rates between 5 and 15% on the other continents. However, even the Latin American health workers in general and the Brazilian ones in particular are aware that there is still some way to go to reach the Millennium Development Goals of bringing the illness to a standstill by 2015.
In that context it is worthwhile to remember that like in any other country facing a sudden health crisis, which spread rapidly from a few individuals in the metropolitan centers to whole families all over the country, Brazil's national policy makers were ill prepared to move decidedly against the disease. Were it not for the active and vocal NGOs and some local governments, especially in the city of Sao Paulo, the national authorities would rather left the crisis lingering for some time. The close relationship the authorities had with the multilateral agencies in general and the World Bank in particular provided the impetus for an organized and well financed program against AIDS in the early 1990s, which then pro- and successes can be maintained remains to be seen. While the current government is committed to pursue the same goals as its predecessor, it seems to lack the human and financial resources the previous authorities could muster. Many of the highly qualified personnel, who worked with the central government in the AIDS campaigns in the 1990s and early
2000s have left the public sector, and the recent negotiations with the MNPCs have dragged on for much longer periods than had been expected. In addition, with newer and better drugs being developed in the years to come, it can be expected that the difficult encounters to negotiate favorable prices for ARVs with the MNPCs will heat up again.
